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Keynote article
A double auction market:
Teaching, experiment, and theory
Martin Shubik
Yale University
Asimultaneousdoubleauctionmarketwithbidandoffercardswasusedinclassesonthetheoryandhistory
ofmoneyandfinancialinstitutionsandoccasionallyinclassesonthetheoryofgames.Theprimepurposein
usingthisgamewastoteachthestudentshowtoconstructprocessmodelsofeconomicphenomena.Thesec-
ondpurposewastoconsiderthepropertiesofthedoubleauctionmarket.Thethirdpurposewastointerpret
the experimental results and link them to theory.
KEYWORDS: double auctions; experimental games; allocation games; noncooperative equilibria
This is in part a plea for sloppy gaming on the cheap. It is a continuation and
enlargement of some observations on gaming for teaching and experimentation
(Shubik, 2002) where next to no resources are used to provide insight and sweeten
intuitionatlittlecost.Thesortofteaching-experiment-theorycombinationnotedhere
is not presented as a substitute for carefully controlled experiments but as a comple-
ment. An experimental game is one form of observation. The more we can observe
behavior in vivo, the better we can see how it matches with behavior in vitro obtained
from carefully controlled experiments.
Asimultaneousdoubleauctionmodelispresentedinthefollowingindetailtoillus-
tratethespecificintermixofteaching,experiment,theory,andeconomyinthegaming
utilization. From 1981 to 2003, in teaching a seminar on the theory and history of
moneyandfinancialinstitutionsandcoursesingametheory,Iemployedasimpledou-
bleauctiongameinclassorinotherlecturesbothtoillustratetheproblemsinthecon-
struction of formal models and to heighten student participation in investigating pro-
cess models in the study of economics. The respondents were not paid and with one
exception played only once in a class or lecture. Most of the use of the games was in
classes at Yale where the students were for the most part undergraduates (seniors) or
master’s degree students.
Althoughthesedoubleauctiongameswererunmorethan20times,partofthedata
fileswerelost.Theresultsnotedherearebasedonthedatafortheremaining15games.
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166Beyond noting the reconfirming but modest results obtained from the informal
experiments,thepurposeofthisarticleistostresstheuseofteachingandtheorycom-
bined with informal experimentation. In particular, the relevance of the results on the
double auction raises many problems in gaming for teaching and experimentation, in
the development of financial models of price movement, and in basic noncooperative
and cooperative game theory. The goal here is limited to pointing out the links, their
potential meaning, and their value in teaching and research.
The double auction market
The double auction market is a well-known mechanism and has been studied in a
simultaneous and sequential form in many ways from the viewpoints of pure theory,
stock market practices, and experimentation. From the viewpoint of noncooperative
game theory applications, the double auction marketisone of the three simplestprice
formation mechanisms that can be constructed (Dubey, 1982; Dubey & Shubik,
1980). When viewed from cooperative game theory, the double auction mechanism
canbeusedtoinvestigatethegameasaformofassignmentgame(Shapley&Shubik,
1971).
Inthesequentialorcontinuousvariation,thedoubleauctionmarketisafairlygood
approximationofthetradingmechanismemployedbytheNewYorkStockExchange
and several other exchanges. The sequential form illustrates the intimate relationship
between this market mechanism and the handling of situations where the sequencing
ofinformationisofconsiderableconcernandwherethereisalackofcommonknowl-
edgeofthevaluationsplacedbyothers.Thesimultaneousmovegameminimizescon-
cern for information conditions and is best described as a model of a form of a sealed
bid.
Ithas been asource of wonder astohow wellthissimplemechanism forms aprice
thatisquicklyclosetothetheoreticalcompetitiveprice.Theinformalteachingexperi-
ments noted here reconfirm this observation. The volume of trade in these “one shot
games” however is significantly lower than called for by the equilibrium analysis.
Prior to discussing the specific games considered here, a brief summary of other
experimental findings is noted.
Comments on some of the experimental results and theory
The literature and experiments on the double auction markets is extensive and to
someextentsurprisinglyseparate.Thereareatleastthreestrandstobenoted.Thereis
the considerable literature on experimentation and what can be described as more or
less central economic theory as well as a growing literature verging somewhat into
behavioralandinformationeconomics;thereisagrowingliteratureinappliedfinance
on price movements in the stock market with a continuous sequential double auction
market; and there is a small literature on the pure game theory of the double auction
market.
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Chamberlin’s (1948) more or less informal class experiment is possibly the origi-
nator of the experimental game in economics. His class apparently motivated Vernon
Smith (1962, 1965; V. L. Smith, Williams, Bratton, & Vannoni, 1982) to consider
experimental gaming as a valuable tool in economics and in particular to consider the
double auction market. There is now an active study of variations on the double auc-
tionmechanism.AbibliographybyHolt(1999)notedaround70references.Thebook
editedbyFriedmanandRust(1993) wasmotivatedbytheneedtoreconcileeconomic
theory with price formation mechanisms. This is possibly the first book to attempt to
dealwiththeroleofinstitutionsandhowtheyinterfacewithcurrenttheoryandexperi-
mental evidence from gaming. The theme developed is consistent with the basic
approach in the development of strategic market games (Shubik, 1972, 1999) in that
generalequilibriumtheoryisnoninstitutionalanddoesnotdealwithprocess,yetprice
formation requires process. Following the methods of game theory and experimental
gaming, to fully specify a playable game the rules must be adequately described. But
the rules themselves can be interpreted as the elementary institutions that carry
process.
Therearefoursourcesinthepastdecadethatprovideareasonablythoroughcover-
ageof much of thework on double auctions,both from theviewpoint of experimental
gamesandsomeeconomictheory.TheyareKlemperer’s(2000)two-volumecoverage
of allvariantsof auctions, Friedman and Rust’s(1993) specialeditedvolume devoted
exclusivelytoallaspectsofthedoubleauction,theencompassingHandbookofExper-
imental Economics by Kagel and Roth (1995) covering all forms of gaming, and the
work on Experimental Economics by Davis and Holt (1993) supplemented by a more
recent bibliography on the Web by Holt (1999).
As there are myriads of institutional variations and sensitivity analysis is virtually
an art form, no attempt is made here to be either exhaustive or to regurgitatei na n y
detail the material covered in these careful references. The key features over which
there appears to be some clear consensus is that the price formed in a double auction
under many variations converges quickly to the competitive equilibrium price. The
convergence of the trading volume is not as immediate. The level of information
required and knowledge of the rules of the game appear to be considerably less than
the requirements of formal game theory (see Sunder, 1995).
Theinfluenceofheterogeneousagentsfollowingdifferentpoliciesisnotwellunder-
stood.TheworkofArthur,Holland,LeBaron,Palmer,andTaylor(1997)pointed to the
possibility that locally successful market strategies of any level of simplicity or com-
plexity carry within them the seeds of their own destruction as they are destroyed and
replaced by other temporarily successful strategies that in turn are imitated.
The finance literature on price formation
Almost disconnected from both the gaming and the game theory literature is the
finance literatureon themovementof marketprices intheNew York Stock Exchange
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This work has its origins in the seminal work of Bachelier (1964). Recent modern
intereststartedpossiblywiththeworkofMendelson(1982)andhaspickedupconsid-
erably in the past 20 years. The models tend to be variations of the stock market com-
puterizedsequentialdoubleauctionmarketorcloselyrelatedcontinuoustradingphys-
ics analogies such as Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik (1997). The program of Farmer and
colleagues has been devoted to both the empiricaldata and to micromodeling process
with an attempt to formalize “market pressure,” which from an economist’s point of
viewmustberelatedtothesurplusperceivedbytheindividuals.TherecentworkofE.
Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, and Krishnamurthy (2002) on the statistical theory of the
double auction and of Farmer, Patelli, and Zovko (2003) on an empirical test of zero-
intelligence agents operating on the data of the London Stock Exchange indicate that
this work is beginning to connect with the economics literature.
Some game theory observations
The game theory literature directly relevant to the double auction includes Wilson
(1987)andSatterthwaiteandWilliams’s(1993)connectionbetweenthesimultaneous
move game and the various sequential games made.
The single simultaneous move double auction game is the third and most complex
ofthethreesimplestone-market-priceformationmechanismsthatcanbeconstructed.
Details and modeling considerations as to how to consider “simplicity” are discussed
elsewhere (Shubik, 1999).
From the viewpoint of theory, practice, and experimentation, the distinction
between the single simultaneous move double auction and multistage versions, espe-
cially the continuous sequential move market, is considerable in information and
memory aspects, but when individual agents are deemed to have little memory, this
may be used to indicatewhy sequentialauctions with apparently near zero-intelligent
agents may be reasonably efficient.
The single simultaneous move double auction
Much of the experimentation in auctions has been performed with considerable
attention paid to the formation of the experimental market price, which is then con-
trasted with the competitive market price derived from the standard economic theory
of the competitive market. When dealing with the double auction mechanism,i ti s
instructive to contrast the solution set of noncooperative equilibrium points with the
competitiveequilibrium.Asimpleexamplewillservetoillustrateboththedelicacyof
the error and the information aspects of the auction mechanism.
Weconsideranauctionwithtraderseachwiththreevaluationsoneithersideofthe
market,asisshowninFigure1.Forsimplicity,weassumeonthesupplysidethatthere
are n individuals each of whom has a single unit for sale with a reservation price of 1.
There are r individuals with a reservation price of p where 1 ≤ p ≤ 5 and there are n
Shubik / A DOUBLE AUCTION MARKET 169individualswithareservationpriceof5.Onthedemandside,weassumethatthereare
nindividuals,eachofwhomwishestobuyasingleunitthatheorshevaluesat5.There
are r buyers with a valuation price of p where 1 ≤ p ≤ 5, and there are n buyers with a
valuation price of 1.
Itiseasytoobservethatthemarketcompetitiveequilibriumpriceisp.Thevolume
oftradewillben+runits,andtherewillbenextramarginaltradersoneachsideofthe
market.Consumerandsellersurpluswillbe4nintotal,whichwillbesplitwitheachof
the extramarginal buyers obtaining (5 – p) and each seller obtaining (p – 1). The mar-
ginal traders obtain zero profit.
Exceptfor somepossibleindeterminacyinpriceorquantitydepending on howthe
marginal pair of traders determines price and the size of the marginal sale, the market
pricewillessentiallybeunique.Thisisnotsoforthenoncooperativeequilibria(NEs).
Any combination of strategies in which an individual seller i offers to sell for an
amount  p≤p
i≤R
iwhereR
iisi’sreserveprice,  pisexpectedmarketprice,andp
iisthe
price named by i. The rational expectations hypothesis is equivalent to the
noncooperativeequilibrium condition. This impliesthattheactualmarketprice p =  p.
Similarly, any buyer j may bid a price p
j such that  p ≤ p
j ≤ V
j.
NEs and truth revelation. Taking any of these combinations, we observe that each
one satisfies the weak-no-improvement property of an NE. Furthermore, the strategy
under which each reveals his or her true preferences by bidding to buy at p
j =V
j or
offering to sell at p
i =R
i is an NE where the histogram of strategies and preferences
coincide.
1
Common knowledge. In a fully defined game, the players are assumed to know the
number of competitors and the strategy sets and pay-offs of their competitors. In this
market mechanism, this game is playable without this information. In the first four
games reported in the following, the players were not even given information on the
possibility that a price had been formed yesterday.
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FIGURE 1: Indeterminacy in PriceOne way in which the arbitrariness of playing the game once without common
knowledgeisavoidedistoinstructthestudentsthatinapreviousplayofthegamewith
conditions similar to theirs, a price was formed and they are informed of this price.
This might be a specific number or a range. If a range is given, then does the referee
specify the probabilities over the range, or is this left to the players?
Intheothergamesreported,eitheraspecificnumberwasgivenorarangewithouta
distribution was provided. A reasonable approximation of market reality is that if the
market has existed before, yesterday’s prices are probably known.
A multistage simultaneous move double auction market. The games reported here
are single simultaneous move games where minimal information conditions are
encountered.Eachindividualhasonlyoneinformationset.Thebulkoftheliteratureis
devoted to sequential bidding where the information conditions are of considerable
importance and can have many institutional variations. A halfway house between
these two conditions is to consider the simultaneous move game played T times with
thepriceandvolumeoftradereportedoneachoccasion.Theconstraintrequiringallto
bid simultaneously has considerable strategic influence.
Buying or selling pressure. How important are the levels of the gains from trade in
promoting the size and timing of bidding? Although there has been some discussion
and experimentation, as yet there appears to be no clear answers; however, a natural
candidate for quantification is the concept of “buying or selling pressure.” The recent
work of Lillo, Farmer, and Mantegna (2000) appears to be concerned with this.
Priceandquantityadjustment.Whenindividualsareconstrainedtobuyingorsell-
ingoneunit(asintheoriginalChamberlinmarket),thisis,fromtheviewpointofgame
theory,restrictiontoaone-dimensionalstrategyset,namely,topricealone.Whenthey
havemore than one unit to buy or sell,anew host of difficultiesappears together with
the two-dimensional strategy set. Not only must quantities as well as prices be
selected,butconstraintsoncashflowsmustbecalculatedandobservedifshortselling
is not permitted.
Although in the games run and reported here only one period was investigated, it
was found that price converged essentially immediately, but the quantity traded was
lowerthanpredictedbygeneralequilibrium.Iconjecturethattheconvergencetoclose
toefficienttradetakesplacesequentially,firsttopriceand thenwithafollow-through
to quantity of trade.
The sequential move double auction. The sequential move double auction market
opensupavastsetofdifferentinformationconditionsandtradingarrangements.Even
if we restrictourselves to some of the simpler formulations, strikingly different infor-
mation conditions are encountered in contrast with the simultaneous move games.
Suppose that in the game described with 4n + 2r traders the activity were sequential
with a pairwise trade following every cross, then it is straightforward to observe that
traders who would be strictlyexcluded from trade inthesimultaneous bid-offer game
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players.
The role of middlemen. Empirically, brokers, dealers, and other forms of middle-
menhaveplayedanimportantroleinmanymarkets(Shubik,1999).Theyhaveserved
asaggregation,disaggregation,andinformationprocessingdevices.Aretheyaneces-
sity,orisitthislayerinthetradingprocessthatcanbereplacedbycomputerization?
Random search for trading pairs
Random search for a trading partner can be regarded as a premarket precursoro fa
more organized and aggregated form of trading. There is a small literature both in the
pure combinatorics of trade and in random matching of pairs as was evinced by Starr
(1976), Rubinstein (1989), Rubenstein and Wolinsky (1985), and Gale (1986). The
type of behavior to consider is where a seller and a buyer meet and decide to either
trade(e.g.,atapointofsplitthedifference)ortohuntforsomeoneelse.Thisliterature
is not far from the queuing rules used in the double auction.
Results from a single play double auction
Inthegamesconsideredhere,eachstudentwasgiveneitherasellerorbuyercardas
are shown in Figures 2a and 2b.
Animportantpartofthevalueoftheexercisecomesinthediscussionofthedetails
required to fully define the market price formation mechanism. Even for the single
simultaneous move double auction, these items include the following:
• Do you know the number of players?
• Do you share common knowledge?
• What history do you have of the market?
• How does it matter?
• Does the name of the good you are trading in matter?
• What is a reserve price?
• Does the unit size of the bid matter?
• Can one sell fractions of a unit?
• Are short sales permitted?
• What are the credit restrictions?
• How are ties resolved?
• Can there be a range of outcomes?
• If so, how is one selected?
• How is profit or gain measured?
If we play thegamemore than once, new problems concerning information condi-
tions and many other time-dependent features appear.
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After the game has been played, in the class discussion the students are asked to
explaintheirbehavior,andthediscussionstressestherelationshipbetweenthemarket
mechanism structure and individual behavior. This leads into the consideration of
what constitutes a solution and to the difference between “objective supply and
demand curves” given by the reservation and valuation prices and the actual bids and
offers made.
A feature of “unreality” concerning the game noted by several students over the
yearsisthemotivationfortheindividualtobidorofferanythingifexpectedprofitsare
zero.Theargumentgivenisinvariablyapositivetransactionscostargument.Ifanindi-
vidual is a member of a marginal pair where exchange yields zero profit to each, why
should they incur the transactions costs of bothering to fill in numbers and turn in the
biddingcosts?Intheexperiments,asclassrulesrequiredtheturninginofthecards,the
quantity offered or bid by some of the marginal traders was zero.
Procedure
The reserve price and the amount for sale by the sellers and the worth of the com-
modityandmoneyavailabletothesellerwerespecifiedandenteredonthecardsbythe
instructor. The way price isformed by the intersection of the bid and offer curves was
explained.
Afterthegamewasplayedbutbeforeithadbeenanalyzed,thedistinctionbetween
theobjectivesupplyanddemandcurvesandthestrategicallydeterminedbidandoffer
curves was discussed.
Asthegameswereplayedinclassprimarilyfortheirexpositoryvalue,therewasno
monetary reward totheindividuals. In someof thepostgamediscussions, someof the
students noted that they might have behaved differently if “real money” had been rid-
ing on the outcome.
The appendix shows a briefing and the results of a play.
SELLER #1 
*Round off your 
  offer to nearest 10¢ 
**Whole units 
BUYER #1 
*Round off your 
  offer to nearest 10¢
**Whole units 
Reserve Price = $____________ 
 
Unit for Sale   =   ____________ 
 
OFFER:  p = price
*                    = $___________
q = quantity offered
** =   ___________ 
 
No “FUTURES” SELLING 
   Offer not valid unless q ________   ________ 
YOUR PROFIT 
   = (Market price – Reserve Price) x (quantity sold) 
Unit Maximum Worth = $____________ 
 
Money Available         =   ____________ 
 
OFFER:  p = price
*                    = $___________
q = quantity offered
** =   ___________ 
 
No “FUTURES” SELLING 
   Bid not valid unless q x p ________   ________ 
YOUR PROFIT 
   = (Unit max worth – Market Price) x (quantity sold) 
(a)  (b) 
FIGURE 2: Bid and Offer CardsThe games and results
Thefirstfourgameswereplayedwithoutgivingthestudentsinformationaboutany
history. The remaining games were played with the students being informed that the
game had been played previously under “more or less the same conditions” and that
thepriceformedhadbeen“fairlyclosetop,”wherepwastheactualcompetitiveprice.
Inthefirsttwogamesastherewereveryfewplayerstheyactedonlyasbuyerswith
the referee supplying the sell side strategies. The last game was played twice by the
same students a week apart.
WeobservefromTable1thateveninaone-playgamethepowerofthepresenceof
oneormoremarginalpairsappearstobesufficienttoobtainimmediateconvergenceto
thecompetitiveprice.Fromtheviewpointofthegametheory,twotradersofeachtype
trading in one commodity are required in the market for competition in both supply
and demand.
Although apriceclosetothecompetitivepricewasobtained inone play,therewas
considerable undertrading in comparison with the competitive equilibrium volume.
Game No. 15 was run a second time (with two fewer bidders) to see if the volume of
trade would increase. In the first run, trade was at the level of 54% of the competitive
equilibrium (CE); in the second trade, it was at 83% of the CE. Considerable replica-
tionisrequired toattachmuch statisticalsignificancetothissingleobservation,butat
least it is consistent with the conjecture that trading will increase with repetition and
with the results of Vernon Smith both concerning slight variations in the number of
market participants and the lack of monetary payments.
Simultaneous or sequential markets?
The games considered here, except for one, have been the single simultaneous
move game, which is the simplest possible, involving essentially no flow of informa-
tiontotheplayersbeyondtheinitialconditions.Onceallmoveshavebeenselected,the
game is over. In contrast, the continuous time auction with bids and offers flowing in
sequentiallyandpricemovingfrommomenttomomentstressesinformationflowand
is a far closer approximation to actual trading on an exchange.
Auctions or markets?
The term auction appears to be derived from the Latin auctio (increase), which
seems to imply a dynamic process with individuals with the ability to change their
bids.Moreproperly,thesimultaneousoroneshotbid-offerstrategicmarketgamethat
differs only from the sequential double auction mechanism in information conditions
canbestbedescribedasthemathematicalequivalentofthesealedbidratherthanasan
open auction where individuals can change their action flexibly.
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ThestimulatingsetofarticlesbySunderandassociates(Bosch-Domènech &Sun-
der, 2000; Gode & Sunder, 1997a, 1997b) over the past few years has been basedo n
simulationsandgameswithliveplayers.Thestrengthoftheconvergencepropertiesof
simplemodelsofbehaviorwheretheindividualseitherbidrandomlyorbidwithweak
constraints obtained from their valuations and budget constraints has been of note.
The NEs of a simultaneous move bid offer market model. A simple simultaneous
move bid offer market model where each individual seller has one unit for sale has
essentially
2 a unique competitive equilibrium, but it has a set of noncooperative equi-
libria all giving the same joint pay-off. The strategy set is precisely that of the Sunder
zero-intelligenceagentsconstrainedtobidinarangethatpreventslosses.Thebidding
constraints guarantee that price will be determined by the marginal pairs and the bid
offermechanismiscompletelyinsensitivetothecardinalpropertiesoftheotherbids.
The truth revelation noncooperative equilibrium: Suppose that all individuals bid
their true reserve and valuation prices. This means that the histograms drawn are pre-
ciselytheconventionalsupplyanddemandcurvesofstandardmicroeconomictheory.
Itcouldbe,asisshowninFigure3,thatthereissomesmallindeterminacyinprice;an
ad hoc rule must be supplied to resolve this.
Select any set of strategies generated by the Sunder zero-intelligence constrained
traders.
3 Replace any one of the traders by a standard rational economic agent. His
pay-off remains the same regardless of his selection of strategies within his no-loss
range.
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TABLE 1: Experimental Results
Expt n Sell Buy p(expt) p(CE) q(expt) q(CE) p = p(C) q = q(C)
1 5 C 5 48 48 100 150 1 .667
2 7 C 7 48 48 175 210 1 .833
3 12 6 6 50 48 140 180 1.04 .778
4 23 13 10 50 48 205 300 1.04 .683
5 22 122 11 6.15 6 25 45 1.025 .556
6 12 6 6 4 4 28 30 1 .933
7 23 12 11 2.5 2.5 28 40 1 .700
8 15 7 8 13 13 14 30 1 .467
9 35 20 15 10 10 97 140 1 .693
10 19 9 10 12 12 20 39 1 .513
11 14 7 7 12 12 13 30 1 .433
12 19 8 11 6 6-7 4 32 1 .125
13 19 10 9 6 6-7 20 36 1 .556
14 18 10 8 11.8 12 10 40 0.983 .25
15a 23 9 14 15 15 113 210 1 .538
15b 22 10 12 15.3 15 150 180 1.02 .833
NOTE: Expt = experimental; CE = competitive equilibrium; C = control.We now observe that the randomization without memory in effect obliterates the
majordifferencebetweenthesimultaneousbid-offermodelandthesequentialdouble
auction,asintheformalsequentialgame,thesizeofanindividualstrategysetdepends
on thenumber of information setsof theindividual.Buttheseagents’lackof memory
preventsthemfromusinginformationdifferentfromthatusedinthebid-offermodel.
4
There still will be a difference in pay-offs and prices as there is only one price in the
simultaneous bid-offer model but price is continuously being formed by pairs in the
zero-intelligence model.
Local and global structure and behavior
Theinvestigationsofgametheorycontainconsiderablymorethanthestructureofa
gameinnormalorstrategicformandthesolutionconceptofaNashequilibriumpoint.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) presented three different primitive structures
for theconsideration of agame.Theyweretheextensiveform, thestrategicform, and
thecoalitionalform.Therearemore.Thegamesoriginallypresentedhadafixedfinite
number of players, yet many models, including those of markets, are better repre-
sented by structures that have a continuous flow of individuals entering and exiting
with no specific start or end to the process. These require yet another formulation.
ConsiderationofsubjectiveprobabilityassuggestedbyHarsanyiandlackofcommon
knowledge as investigated by Aumann and others call for even more basic models.
Even if we limitourselvesto fully defined gameswith common knowledge and no
subjectiveprobability,thelinksamongthedifferentprimitiveformsofagameofstrat-
egy have been scarcely studied. It is well known that there is a many to one mapping
fromtheextensiveformtothestrategicform.Furthermore,thereusuallyissomeextra
modelingrequired,andtheremaybeamanytoonemappingfromthestrategicformto
the coalitional form.
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FIGURE 3: The Noncooperative EquilibriumThe general equilibrium analysis, by throwing away process, managed to rid itself
of the institutions that carry process. To a certain extent, the coalition form of a game
does the same. But any attempt to link the coalitional form with strategic or extensive
form requires a linking of the specific rules of the game in such a manner that the
coalitionalformisnolongertakenasaprimitiveconceptbutisderivedfromafarmore
detailed (and essentially institutional) form.
The grand theorists, defending both general equilibrium theory and cooperative
game theory, might argue that they are after the great invariants of the economic sys-
tem and do not wish to have their thinking beclouded by institutional detail. To some
extent there is merit in trying to avoid detailprovided that the loss of detailis not fatal
tounderstanding thequestionsathand.Butthepricepaidbybothgeneralequilibrium
theory and cooperative game theory was to totally wipe out process in the analysis.
The reason why I switched from the study of market games using the coalitional
form tostrategicmarketgamesusing thestrategicor extensiveforms of thegamewas
thatthestudyofeconomiesusingmoneyhastoinvolveprocess.Marketsandpricefor-
mation form a critical part of the model. Disequilibrium positions as well as equilib-
riumpositionsmustbeconsidered.Thatiswhatmoney,cashflowpositions,creditand
bankruptcy, and reorganization are all about.
Initially I was concerned that there was an insurmountable gap between the
noninstitutional models of general equilibrium and cooperative games and the intrin-
sically institutional models of games in strategic form. However, there is at least one
approach that indicates that the choice is not one or the other. It may be that although
associated with many games in strategic form, there is a single game in cooperative
form; there is a reasonable criterion that indicates that the different games are “close
enough” thatfor thepurposes athand theycanberegarded asmore or lessequivalent.
One way of studying this possibility isto consider the behavior of various game theo-
retic solutions to games with large numbers of players. Dubey, Mas-Colell, and
Shubik (1980) showed that there are large classes of mechanisms whose equilibrium
positions are the same when the number of agents is large. Although this result was
established and helps to answer many questions concerning the existence of equilib-
rium prices, it gives us no insight whatsoever into the dynamics of price formation.
The understanding of the links between specific games in extensive form and
related games in coalitional form still has a long way to go. The natural and possibly
easiestcandidateisthesequentialdoubleauctionmodelinitsmanyvariationsandthe
simultaneousbid-offergame.Asisindicatedearlier,thespecialstructureofthemech-
anism makes it extremely robust to strategic variations in all but the strategies of the
marginal pairs. Several variations of the sequential continuous time double auction
with“openbook,”namely,completeinformationconcerningbidsandoffers,appearto
be amenable to analysis. From the point of view of games in coalition form, they may
be used together with the simultaneous bid-offer game to construct upper and lower
boundingcharacteristicfunctionsthatreflectthedifferencesintheinformationcondi-
tions between the games with minimal and maximal information. If the memories of
thetraders arelimited,thedistinctionbetweengameswithmanyinformation setsand
few information sets is limited.
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Thereisoftenagreattemptationtotrytoexplainsomephenomenononaneither/or
basis when often the explanation may be more consistent with a mixture of both. In
particular, along with the growth of behavioral finance there has been a tendency to
stresstheimportanceofherdandirrationalbehaviorinthemarkets.Experimentshave
beenrunusingbothbusinessmen(Shubik,1970)andstudents(V.L.Smith,Suchanek,
& Williams, 1988) that display bubbles being formed. If this is so, then where does
homo oeconomicus or the rational optimizing economic agent fit into the picture? A
possible explanation is that both behaviors are consistent with the functioning of the
marketsystem.Thebasicforceintheachievingofallocationalefficiencygivenvalua-
tions and reserve prices is provided by the structure of the market mechanism. Thus,
the stress isintelligentdesign of the mechanism so thatsocietalgoals can be achieved
bysimplelocaloptimizers;buttheanalyticaldepthofconsciouseconomicbehavioris
primarilydirectedtowardvaluation,whichinturnservesasaboundonsimplemarket
behavior.
It is possible that there exists a small class of experts in social psychology who
profit over the long term while basing their actions on phenomena such as the Elliot
wave studies or other forms of market charting analysis. The simulations of Arthur
et al. (1997) and elementary game theory considerations indicate that no behavioral
strategy is going to work consistently in the short run market once a sufficiently large
number of entrants have adopted it. If there is an artificialor a natural barrier to entry,
such as a short supply of ingenious social psychologists or stochastic process model-
ers, a small set of behavioral experts might earn their long-term rents.
Even more likely than the presence of the behavioral experts, and consistent with
boththeexperimentalevidenceandbasicfinance,duediligence,andsecuritiesanaly-
sis (Whitman & Shubik, 1979), is thatthere exists a setof fundamental value analysts
whosetimeisdevotedtodeeperandmorecomplexvaluationoftheassetsthanmostof
the other individuals in the markets. Good due diligence callsfor both high economic
rationality and both macro- and microeconomic forecasting, but it is essentially an
individualeconomicvaluationandnotabeautycontestasKeynesdescribedtheshort-
term stock market. There is no reason to expect that the “market timing” or ability of
the economic valuation experts is much better than a random agent in “beating the
market” in the short term.
Boththeoptimizationofevaluationandallocationplayabasicroleinthefunction-
ing of a market economy. They are interlinked but different activities. Both from the
individual and societal points of view, the productivity of deep analysis is most likely
to be in a one-person evaluation of real assets, even with stochastic income forecasts,
thaninanattempttoestimatestrategiesandvaluationsofcompetitiveagentsinastock
market.
The financial system and price formation mechanisms of markets attempt to pro-
vide an efficient allocation mechanism for an economy in constant motion. A basic
consideration of the sequencing of moves is sufficient to show that individuals with
superior information or valuation can benefit from this advantage (Dubey,
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simplealgorithmsfor hillclimbingorfor complexoptimization.Thelimitedcapacity
agent has to choose where to utilize complexity if he or she is capable and motivated
andwheretostaywithsimplicity.Formost,butnotall,individualswithtimeandintel-
ligencetoinvestactively,
5thebetterbetisprobably toaimforsimplicityinthemarket
and economic sophistication in evaluation.
A plea for interdisciplinary collaboration in gaming
Inthegamingexperimentsdescribedhere,cheap,simple,poorly controlledgames
were used in class to teach, to delve into highly formal theory, and to produce reason-
ablyinterestingresultsaswellastoprovokebasicquestionsfromthestudents.Iregret
that I was unable to have a social psychologist colleague in class with me. I feel sure
thattheexperiencecouldhavebeenenrichedconsiderably,inparticularintheanalysis
of the rich trove of comments by the students.
The growth of the gaming and simulation literature in economics, social psychol-
ogy, political science, and formal game theory has been considerable but far more
compartmentalizedthanisoptimal.AjournalsuchasSimulation&Gamingisdevoted
to breaking down the separation not only among the disciplines but also among the
purposes. Teaching, theory, experimentation, and economy belong together.
Appendix
Game 7
Youareeitherabuyerorsellerinamarketforasinglegood.Thisisthesecondtime
thatthemarkethasmetandtheonlyinformationyouhave(beyondyourknowledgeof
your own resources and their value to you) is the price in the last market and the vol-
ume of trade
Last period the price was: $2.50
The volume of trade was: 60
that there may be a few more or a few less participants in the market this time.
Ifyou areaselleryou mustselectapricepatorabovewhichyou arewillingtosell
uptoanamountq,whichyoumustalsoselect.Thepricecanbeanynonnegativenum-
ber. The quantity must not be greater than the amount of the good that you have.
If you are a buyer, you must select a price p* at or below which you are willing to
buyuptoanamountq*,whichyoumustalsoselect.p*q*mustnotbegreaterthanthe
amount of cash on hand that you have.
The bids willallbe lined up in descending order of price bid, and the offers willbe
lined up in ascending order of price offered. Where these two histograms cross will
determine the ruling market price and the volume of trade.
If there are any ties or indeterminacies, the referee will prorate or take a mean.
Shubik / A DOUBLE AUCTION MARKET 179Analysis of Game 7
Youplayedinasimplegamerepresentingasimultaneousbidlowinformationdou-
ble auction market. The theoreticalequilibrium solution isgiven on the graph (Figure
4).Theinformationyouweregivenwasbasedontherebeing15tradersoneachsideof
the market. You actually played with 12 on one side and 11 on the other.
You were given the previous price and volume as context for your decision. It
appears that the price information was used as an important cue.
The volume transacted was considerably less than the equilibrium theory would
predict.
Notes
1.Iftherearetwoormoremarginalpairsofagentstradinginmorethanoneuniteach,arationingscheme
may be required.
2. A way must be specified for resolvingsome indeterminacy in price caused by the integer propertyof
thegoods.Inactualmarkets,rulessuchas“splitthedifference,”orsatisfytheoffererorbidderfirst,ortossa
faircoinmaybeused.Atie-breakingrulemustalsobespecifiedifthereissomeexcesssupplyordemandat
the market price.
3. The constraint prevents extramarginal traders from trading. If the traders are merely fully random
within the same range, as noted by Sunder (1995), extramarginal trade may occur.
4. For a discussion of the influenceof varyinginformationsets on the same economicmarket structure,
see Dubey and Shubik (1981).
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Bids
Quantity
Price
10 20 30 40 50 60
200
80
300
28
Reserve price
Value
Offers
Trade point
20
30
40
60
-150
350
Market
price
Theory
  C.E. Price: $2.40-2.60
  Quantity: 44
Actual
  Price: $2.50
  Quantity: 28
FIGURE 4: Postplay Information to Participants5.Inthestockmarket,theremaybesomehighlyintelligentnicheplayersoperatingonthedetailsofspe-
cial instruments and arbitrages. There are also brokers and specialists earning commissions and something
off the top who do not care which way the market goes as long as volume remains high.
References
Arthur, W. B., Holland,J. H.,LeBaron,B., PalmerR., & Taylor, P. (1997).Asset pricingunderendogenous
expectationsinanartificialstockmarket.InW.B.Arthur,S.N.Durlauf,&D.H.Lane(Eds.),Theecon-
omy as an evolving complex system (pp. 15-44). Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
Bachelier, L. (1964). Theorie de la spéculation (1900) [Theory of speculation]. In P. H. Cootner (Ed.), The
random character of stock prices (pp. 17-18). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bak,P.,Paczuski,M.,&Shubik,M.(1997).Pricevariationsinastockmarketwithmanyagents.PhysicaA,
246, 430-453.
Bosch-Domènech,A.,&Sunder,S.(2000).Trachingtheinvisiblehand:Convergenceofdoubleauctionsto
competitive equilibrium. Computational Economics, 16, 257-284.
Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political Economy, 56, 95-108.
Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993).Experimental economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dubey, P. (1982). Price-quantity strategic market games. Econometrica, 50, 111-126.
Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., & Shubik, M. (1987). The revelation of informationin strategic market games.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16, 105-137.
Dubey,P.,Mas-Colell,A.,&Shubik,M.(1980).Efficiencypropertiesofstrategicmarketgames:Anaxiom-
atic approach. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 339-362.
Dubey, P., & Shubik, M. (1980). A strategic market game with price and quantity strategies. Zeitschrift für
Nationalokonomie, 40(1-2), 25-34.
Dubey, P., & Shubik, M. (1981). Information conditions, communication and general equilibrium. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 6, 186-189.
Farmer, J. D., Patelli, O., & Zovko, I. I. (2003). The predictive power of zero intelligence in financial mar-
kets. Unpublished manuscript, Santa Fe Institute.
Friedman, D., & Rust, J. (Eds.). (1993). The double auction market: Institutions, theories and evidence.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Gale, D. (1986). Bargaining and competition Part 1: Characterization. Econometrica, 54, 785-806.
Gode,D. K.,&Sunder, S. (1997a).Allocative efficiencyofmarkets withzerointelligencetraders:Markets
as a partial substitute for individual rationality. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 119-137.
Gode,D.K.,&Sunder,S.(1997b).Whatmakesmarketsallocationallyefficient.QuarterlyJournalofEco-
nomics, 12, 603-630.
Holt, C. A. (1999). Y2K bibliography of experimental economics and social science: Double auction mar-
kets. Available from http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/day2k.htm
Kagel,J.H.,&Roth,A.E.(1995).Handbookofexperimentaleconomics.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniver-
sity Press.
Klemperer, P. (2000). The economic theory of auctions (Vols. 1-2). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Lillo, F., Farmer, J. D., & Mantegna, R. N. (2000). Econophysics: Master curve for price-impact function.
Nature, 121, 129-130.
Mendelson, H. (1982). Market behavior in a clearing house. Econometrica, 50, 1505-1524.
Rubinstein,A.(1989).Competitiveequilibriuminamarketwithdecentralizedtradeandstrategicbehavior:
An introduction. In G. Feiwel (Ed.), The economics of imperfect competition and employment: Joan
Robinson and beyond (pp. 243-259). New York: Macmillan.
Rubinstein,A., & Wolinsky, A. (1985).Equilibriumin a market with sequentialbargaining.Econometrica,
53, 113-150.
Satterthwaite,M.A.,&Williams,S.R.(1993).TheBayesiantheoryofthek-doubleauction.InD.Friedman
& J. Rust (Eds.), The double auction market (pp. 99-124). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Shubik / A DOUBLE AUCTION MARKET 181Shapley,L.S.,&Shubik,M.(1971).Theassignmentgame,I:Thecore.InternationalJournalofGameThe-
ory, 1, 111-130.
Shubik, M. (1970). A 1970 note on a simulated stockmarket. Decision Sciences, 1, 129-141.
Shubik, M. (1972). Commodity money, oligopoly, credit and bankruptcy in a general equilibrium model.
Western Economic Journal, 11(1), 24-38.
Shubik, M. (1999). The theory of money and financial institutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shubik,M.(2002).Theusesofteachinggamesingametheoryclassesandsomeexperimentalgames.Simu-
lation & Gaming, 33, 137-156.
Smith,E.,Farmer,J.D.,Gillemot,L.,&Krishnamurthy,S.(2002).Statisticaltheoryofthecontinuousdou-
ble auction (Santa Fe Institute Working Paper No. 02-10-057).
Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy,
70, 111-137.
Smith,V.L.(1965).ExperimentalauctionmarketsandtheWalrasianhypothesis.JournalofPoliticalEcon-
omy, 73, 387-393.
Smith,V.L.,Suchanek,G.L.,&Williams,A.W.(1988).Bubbles,crashesandendogenousexpectationsin
experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica, 56, 1119-1152.
Smith,V.L.,Williams,A.,Bratton,W.K.,&Vannoni,M.G.(1982).Competitivemarketinstitutions:Dou-
ble auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions. American Economic Review, 72, 58-77.
Starr, R. (1976). Decentralized nonmonetary trade.Econometrica, 44, 1087-1089.
Sunder, S. (1995). Experimental asset markets: A survey. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of
experimental economics (pp. 445-500). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
VonNeumann,J.&Morgenstern,O.(1944).Thetheoryofgamesandeconomicbehavior.Princeton:Prince-
ton University Press.
Whitman, M. J., & Shubik, M. (1979).The aggressive conservative investor. New York: Random House.
Wilson,R.(1987).Equilibriuminbid-askmarkets.InE.Fiewel(Ed.),Arrowandtheascentofeconomicthe-
ory (pp. 375-414). London: McMillan.
Martin Shubikis a professor of mathematicalinstitutionaleconomics at Yale University. He has used gam-
ing for teaching and experimentation since 1957.
ADDRESS: MS: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, Box 208281, New
Haven, CT 06520-8281,USA; telephone: +1 203-432-3718;fax: +1 203-432-6167;e-mail:
martin.shubik@yale.edu.
182 SIMULATION & GAMING / June 2005